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Abstract. Anonymity means that the identity of the user performing a certain ac-
tion is maintained secret. The protocols for ensuring anonymity often use random
mechanisms which can be described probabilistically. In this paper we propose a
notion of weak probabilistic anonymity, where weak refers to the fact that some
amount of probabilistic information may be revealed by the protocol. This in-
formation can be used by an observer to infer the likeliness that the action has
been performed by a certain user. The aim of this work is to study the degree of
anonymity that the protocol can still ensure, despite the leakage of information.
We illustrate our ideas by using the example of the dining cryptographers with
biased coins. We consider both the cases of nondeterministic and probabilistic
users. Correspondingly, we propose two notions of weak anonymity and we in-
vestigate their respective dependencies on the biased factor of the coins.
1 Introduction
Anonymity is the property of keeping secret the identity of the user performing a certain
action. The need for anonymity may raise in a wide range of situations, like postings on
electronic forums, voting, delation, donations, and many others.
The protocols for ensuring anonymity often use random mechanisms. This is the
case, for example, of the Dining Cryptographers [6], Crowds [10], and Onion Routing
[14].
Various notions of probabilistic anonymity have been investigated in the literature
[6, 10, 7, 4]. In this paper we propose a notion of weak probabilistic anonymity, where
weak refers to the fact that some amount of probabilistic information may be revealed
by the protocol. Typical causes may be either the presence of attackers which inter-
fere with the normal execution the protocol, or some unavoidable imperfection of the
internal mechanisms, or may even be inherent to the way the protocol is designed. In
any case, the information leaked by the system can be used by an observer to infer the
likeliness that the action has been performed by a certain user. The aim of this work is
to study the degree of anonymity that the protocol can still ensure, despite the leakage
of information.
We illustrate our ideas by using the example of the Dining Cryptographers Problem
(DCP). In this protocol, a number of users (cryptographers) cooperate to ensure that the
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occurrence of a certain action is made visible, while the cryptographer who has per-
formed it remains anonymous. They achieve this goal by executing a certain algorithm
which involves coin tossing. In the original formulation of [6] the coins are perfectly
fair and no one (except the authorized cryptographers) gets any information about the
results of the coins. As a consequence of these assumptions, the protocol ensures strong
anonymity in the sense that, from the point of view of an observer, there is no way to
infer that a cryptographers is more likely than another to have performed the action.
We consider a more realistic scenario in which some probabilistic information may
be leaked by the system. In particular, we consider the case in which this happens due
to imperfections in its internal mechanisms. In the case of the DCP, this means to relax
the hypothesis of perfect fairness of the coins. It is worth noting that even if an observer
does not know a priori whether and how much the coins in the DCP are biased, he may
be able to infer it statistically by running the protocol several times [4]. One of the main
purposes of this work is to investigate how the biased factor of the coins influences the
level of anonymity that the system can still achieve.
An issue to consider when we deal with a probabilistic system is whether or not
there is also some nondeterministic choice involved. Nondeterministic means that the
choice is completely unpredictable. In anonymity protocols, the user which perform
the action may be selected either nondeterministically or probabilistically. In the non-
deterministic case, the probabilistic aspect of anonymity can only be relative to the
probability of the observables, which derives solely from the randomness of the in-
ternal mechanisms of the protocol. The natural notion of anonymity is then that the
probability of the observables does not give information about the user.
In the case of probabilistic users, there are two possible points of view under which
one can define the notion of anonymity. Namely, we can focus on the probability of the
observables, and require that they do not allow to infer information about the probability
of the users (similarly to the nondeterministic case), or we can focus on the probability
of the users, and require that the system does not allow to infer extra information about
it through the observables. Interestingly, in the case of strong anonymity these two
notions have been proved equivalent [4].
In this paper we consider both the cases of nondeterministic and probabilistic users,
and we propose two notions of weak anonymity corresponding to the two points of view
illustrated above. Although, as just said, in the limit case of strong anonymity these two
notions are equivalent, their functional dependency on the biased factor of the coins
turns out to be totally different.
1.1 Contributions
The main contributions of this work are:
– We propose two notions of weak probabilistic anonymity, for the cases of nonde-
terministic and probabilistic users, respectively.
– We consider the Dining Cryptographers with biased coins, and we study how the
two notions of weak anonymity depend on the biased factor of the coins.
– We show how to code the formulas that expresses weak anonymity in PRISM, so
that their validity can be checked automatically on a generic protocol.
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1.2 Plan of the paper
In next section we recall some notions which are used in the rest of the paper: the
Probabilistic Automata, the Dining Cryptographers Problem, and the framework for
anonymity developed in [4]. In Section 3 we propose a notion of weak anonymity for
nondeterministic users, and we study the dependency on the biased factor of the coins
for the DCP. In Section 4 we do the same for the case of probabilistic users. In Section
5 we code in PRISM the DCP and the notions of anonymity. Finally, in Section 6 we
conclude and discuss some related work.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Nondeterminism and probability
In this paper we consider systems that can perform both probabilistic and nondetermin-
istic choice. Intuitively, a probabilistic choice represents a set of alternative transitions,
each of them associated to a certain probability of being selected. The sum of all proba-
bilities on the alternatives of the choice must be 1, i.e. they form a probability distribu-
tion. Nondeterministic choice is also a set of alternatives, but we have no information
on how likely one alternative is selected.
We take the point of view that a nondeterministic choice is not a probabilistic choice
with unknown probabilities: in the latter, if we repeatedly run the program, we can infer
the probability. For instance, if we have a choice between two transitions and we ob-
serve that they are selected with the same frequency, we can infer that the probability
is close to 1/2. In the nondeterministic case, this inference would be invalid. Nondeter-
ministic means that the choice is totally unpredictable and that there is no assumption
of regularity through time on the mechanisms that determine the selection.
There have been many models proposed in literature that combine both nondeter-
ministic and probabilistic choice. One of the most general is the formalism of prob-
abilistic automata proposed in [13]. We give here a brief and informal description of
it.
A probabilistic automaton consists in a set of states, and labeled transitions be-
tween them. For each node, the outgoing transitions are partitioned in groups called
steps. Each step represents a probabilistic choice, while the choice between the steps is
nondeterministic.
Figure 1 illustrates some examples of probabilistic automata. We represent a step
by putting an arc across the member transitions. For instance, in (a), state s1 has two
steps, the first is a probabilistic choice between two transitions with labels a and b, each
with probability 1/2. When there is only a transition in a step, like the one from state
s3 to state s6, the probability is of course 1 and we omit it.
In this paper, we use only a simplified kind of automaton, in which from each node
we have either a probabilistic choice or a nondeterministic choice (more precisely, either
one step or a set of singleton steps), like in (b). In the particular case that the choices
are all probabilistic, like in (c), the automaton is called fully probabilistic.
Given an automaton M , we denote by etree(M) its unfolding, i.e. the tree of all pos-
sible executions of M (in Figure 1 the automata coincide with their unfolding because
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Fig. 1. Examples of probabilistic automata
there is no loop). If M is fully probabilistic, then each execution (maximal branch) of
etree(M) has a probability obtained as the product of the probability of the edges along
the branch. In the finite case, we can define a probability measure for each set of execu-
tions, called event, by summing up the probabilities of the elements3. Given an event x,
we will denote by p(x) the probability of x. For instance, let the event c be the set of all
computations in which c occurs. In (c) its probability is p(c) = 1/3×1/2+1/6 = 1/3.
When nondeterminism is present, the probability can vary, depending on how we
resolve the nondeterminism. In other words we need to consider a function ς that, each
time there is a choice between different steps, selects one of them. By pruning the non-
selected steps, we obtain a fully probabilistic execution tree etree(M, ς) on which we
can define the probability as before. For historical reasons (i.e. since nondeterminism
typically arises from the parallel operator), the function ς is called scheduler.
It should then be clear that the probability of an event is relative to the particular
scheduler. We will denote by pς(x) the probability of the event x under the scheduler ς .
For example, consider (a). We have two possible schedulers determined by the choice
of the step in s1. Under one scheduler, the probability of c is 1/2. Under the other, it
is 2/3 × 1/2 + 1/3 = 2/3. In (b) we have three possible schedulers under which the
probability of c is 0, 1/2 and 1, respectively.
2.2 The Dining Cryptographers
The general Dining Cryptographers Problem [6] is described as follows: A number of
cryptographers, situated in the nodes of a given connected graph, are having a dinner.
The representative of their organization (master) may or may not pay the bill of the
dinner. If he does not, then he will select exactly one cryptographer and order him to
pay the bill. The master will tell secretly each cryptographer whether he has to pay or
not. The cryptographers would like to reveal whether the bill is paid by the master or
3 In the infinite case things are more complicated: we cannot define a probability measure for all
sets of execution, and we need to consider as event space the σ-field generated by the cones of
etree(M). However, in this paper, we consider only the finite case.
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by one of them, but, in the latter case, they wish to keep anonymous the identity of the
payer.
A possible solution to this problem, described in [6], is to associate a coin to each
edge of the graph, visible only to the adjacent cryptographers. The coins are then tossed,
and each cryptographer computes the binary sum of the adjacent coins (counting 0, say,
for head and 1 for tail), adds 1 if he is the payer, and outputs the result.
In [6] it is proved that the payer is one of the cryptographers if and only if the binary
sum of all the outputs is 1. Furthermore, if the coins are fair, then an external observer
cannot identify the payer when it is one of the cryptographers.
The DCP will be a running example through the paper.
2.3 Anonymity systems
In this section we recall our approach to anonymity, as developed in [4].
We model the anonymity protocol as a probabilistic automaton M . The concept of
anonymity is relative to the set of anonymous users and to what is visible to the observer.
Hence, following [12, 11] we classify the actions of M into the three sets A, B and C
as follows:
– A is the set of the anonymous actions A = {a(i) | i ∈ I} where I is the set of the
identities of the anonymous users and a is an injective functions from I to the set
of actions, which we call abstract action. We also call the pair (I, a) anonymous
action generator.
– B is the set of the observable actions. We will use b, b′, . . . to denote the elements
of this set.
– C is the set of the remaining actions (which are unobservable).
Note that the actions in A normally are not visible to the observer, or at least, not for the
part that depends on the identity i. However, for the purpose of defining and verifying
anonymity we model the elements of A as visible outcomes of the system.
Definition 1. An anonymity system is a tuple (M, I, a, B,Z , p), where M is a proba-
bilistic automaton, (I, a) is an anonymous action generator, B is a set of observable
actions, Z is the set of all possible schedulers for M , and for every ς ∈ Z , pς is the
probability measure on the event space generated by etree(M, ς).
If the system is fully probabilistic, then Z is a singleton and we omit it.
We introduce the following notation to represent the events of interest:
– a(i) : all the executions in etree(M, ς) containing the action a(i);
– a : all the executions in etree(M, ς) containing an action a(i) for an arbitrary i;
– o : all the executions in etree(M, ς) containing as their maximal sequence of ob-
servable actions the sequence o (where o is of the form b1b2 . . . bn for some b1, b2, . . . , bn ∈
B). We denote by O (observables) the set of all such o’s.
We use the symbols ∪, ∩ and ¬ to represent the union, the intersection, and the com-
plement of events, respectively.
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We wish to keep the notion of observables as general as possible, but we still need to
make some assumptions on them. First, we want the observables to be disjoint events.
Second, they must cover all possible outcomes. Third, an observable o must indicate
unambiguously whether a has taken place or not, i.e. it either implies a, or it implies
¬a. In set-theoretic terms it means that either o is a subset of a or of the complement of
a. Formally:
Assumption 1 (on the observables)
1. ∀ς ∈ Z . ∀o1, o2 ∈ O. o1 6= o2 ⇒ pς(o1 ∪ o2) = pς(o1) + pς(o2)
2. ∀ς ∈ Z . pς(O) = 1
3. ∀ς ∈ Z . ∀o ∈ O. (pς(o ∩ a) = pς(o)) ∨ pς(o ∩ ¬a) = pς(o)
Analogously, we need to make some assumption on the anonymous actions. We
consider first the conditions tailored for the nondeterministic users: each scheduler de-
termines completely whether an action of the form a(i) takes place or not, and in the
positive case, there is only one such i. Formally:
Assumption 2 (on the anonymous actions, for nondeterministic users)
∀ς ∈ Z . pς(a) = 0 ∨ (∃i ∈ I. (pς(a(i)) = 1 ∧ ∀j ∈ I. j 6= i ⇒ pς(a(j)) = 0))
In [4] the following strong notion of anonymity was proposed. Intuitively, given
two schedulers ς and ϑ that both choose a (say a(i) and a(j), respectively), it should
not be possible to detect from the probabilistic measure of the observables whether the
scheduler was ς or ϑ (i.e. whether the selected user was i or j).
Definition 2 ((Strong) anonymity for nondeterministic users). A system (M, I, a, B,Z , p)
is anonymous if
∀ς, ϑ ∈ Z . ∀o ∈ O. pς(a) = pϑ(a) = 1 ⇒ pς(o) = pϑ(o)
We now consider the case in which the users are fully probabilistic. The assumption
on the anonymous actions in this case is much weaker: we only require that there be at
most one user that performs a, i.e. a(i) and a(j) must be disjoint for i 6= j. Formally:
Assumption 3 (on the anonymous actions, for probabilistic users)
∀i, j ∈ I. i 6= j ⇒ p(a(i) ∪ a(j)) = p(a(i)) + p(a(j))
The probabilistic counterpart of Definition 2 can be formalized using the concept
of conditional probability. Recall that, given two events x and y with p(y) > 0, the
conditional probability of x given y, denoted by p(x | y), is equal to p(x ∩ y)/p(y).
Definition 3. A fully probabilistic system (M, I, a, B, p) is anonymous if
∀i, j ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. (p(a(i)) > 0 ∧ p(a(j)) > 0) ⇒ p(o | a(i)) = p(o | a(j))
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The notions of anonymity illustrated so far focus on the probability of the observ-
ables. In the case of probabilistic users, however, one can also approach the concept
of anonymity from the point of view of the probabilistic information associated to
the users. This is the perspective adopted in [7] to define what they call conditional
anonymity. The idea is that a system is anonymous if the observations do not change
the probability of the a(i)’s. In other words, we may know the probability of a(i) by
some means external to the system, but the system should not increase our knowledge
about it. The same notion was proposed, implicitly, in [6]. This concept can be formu-
lated in our framework as follows:
Definition 4 ((Strong) anonymity for probabilistic users). A fully probabilistic sys-
tem (M, I, a, B, p) is anonymous if
∀i ∈ I. ∀o ∈ O. p(o ∩ a) > 0 ⇒ p(a(i) | o) = p(a(i) | a)
Despite Definitions 3 and 4 are based on conceptually different interpretations of
anonymity, it was shown in [4] that they are equivalent.
The definitions of anonymity illustrated in this section are satisfied by the DCP
only if the coins are fair. In next sections we propose weak versions of these definitions,
which may be satisfied also when the coins are biased, depending on the biased factor.
3 Weak anonymity for nondeterministic users
In this section we propose a weak variant of Definition 2 and we study, in the particular
case of the DCP, how this property depends on the biased factor of the coins.
Intuitively, the weakening consists in relaxing the constraint that the probability of
an observer implying a is the same under every scheduler. Instead, we require that the
difference between any two such probabilities does not exceed a certain parameter α.
Formally:
Definition 5 (α-anonymity for nondeterministic users). Given α ∈ [0, 1], a system
(M, I, a, B, Z, p) is α-anonymous if
max{ pς(o) − pϑ(o) | ς, ϑ ∈ Z, o ∈ O, pς(o ∩ a) = pς(o), pϑ(o ∩ a) = pϑ(o)} = α
Intuitively, pς(o) − pϑ(o) = α means that, whenever we observe o, we suspect
that user i is more likely than user j to have performed the action by an additive factor
α (where i and j represent the users selected by ς and ϑ, respectively).
Let us consider the DCP on a linear graph consisting of three nodes, i.e. three cryp-
tographers Crypt0, Crypt1, and Crypt2, and two edges, Coin0 between Crypt0 and
Crypt1, and Coin1, between Crypt1 and Crypt2.
In case one of the cryptographers pays (event a), the possible observables are
o1 = 111 o2 = 100 o3 = 010 o4 = 001
where b0b1b2 refers to the outputs of Crypt 0, Crypt1 and Crypt2, respectively. For
instance, if Crypt1 is the payer, then o1 is obtained when both the two coins give 1, o2
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Fig. 2. The DCP with three cryptographers and nondeterministic master.
is obtained when Coin0 gives 1 and Coin1 gives 0, etc. In case the master pays, then
the possible observables are o5 = 110, o6 = 101, o7 = 011, o8 = 000. For instance,
o5 = 110 is obtained when Coin0 gives 1 and Coin1 gives 0.
The probabilistic automaton corresponding to this situation is illustrated in Figure 2.
For simplicity, we have drawn only the “big-step-transitions” corresponding to the ob-
servables o1, o2 etc. They represents sequences of “small-step-transitions” where each
coin is flipped, then each cryptographer in turn reads the coins, then it computes and
output the results.
It is important to note that we will consider only one form of nondeterminism: that
associated to the choice of the master (nondeterministic master, which in the DCP is
synonymous of nondeterministic users). In general in a system there is also the nonde-
terminism caused by the different possible interleaving of the various components of
the system, but here, for simplicity, we will assume that the order in which the various
components of the system (master, cryptographers, coins) execute their operations is
fixed. In any case, it can be shown that this latter form of nondeterminism would not
affect the properties of the DCP with respect to anonymity.
Let us represent by βi the “biased factor” of Coin i, i.e. the probability that Coin i
gives 0. We want to determine how the parameter α of anonimity (Definition 5) depends
on β0 and β1.
Consider, for each scheduler that selects a payer among the cryptographers, the pos-
sible observables and their probability measure. A simple calculation gives the figures
shown in Table 1. Then by case analysis, we obtain:
α =



|1 − (β0 + β1)| if (β0, β1 ≤ 0.5) or (β0, β1 ≥ 0.5);
|β0 − β1| if (β0 > 0.5 and β1 < 0.5) or (β0 < 0.5 and β1 > 0.5);
Figure 3 shows the graph of α as a function of β0 and β1.
The above analysis can be extended to the general case of linear graphs with any
number of nodes.
Theorem 1. In the DCP on a linear graph with n nodes the α in Definition 5 depends
on the βi’s as follows:
α =
∏
βi≥0.5
βi
∏
βj<0.5
(1 − βj) −
∏
βi≥0.5
(1 − βi)
∏
βj<0.5
βj
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Observables: o1 = 111, o2 = 100, o3 = 010, o4 = 001
Crypt0 pays Crypt1 pays Crypt2 pays
p(o1) β0(1 − β1) (1 − β0)(1 − β1) (1 − β0)β1
p(o2) β0β1 (1 − β0)β1 (1 − β0)(1 − β1)
p(o3) (1 − β0)β1 β0β1 β0(1 − β1)
p(o4) (1 − β0)(1 − β1) β0(1 − β1) β0β1
Table 1. Probabilities of the observables in the case of 3 cryptographers on a linear graph.
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Fig. 3. The dependency of α-anonymity on β0 and β1 in the case of three cryptographers.
Proof The highest possible probability for an observable corresponds to the coin con-
figuration
Coin i = 0 for βi ≥ 0.5 and Coinj = 1 for βj < 0.5 (1)
Conversely, the minimal probability corresponds to
Coin ′i = 1 for βi ≥ 0.5 and Coin
′
j = 0 for βj < 0.5 (2)
Clearly these configurations are obtained, respectively, with probabilities
p1 =
∏
βi≥0.5
βi
∏
βj<0.5
(1 − βj) and p2 =
∏
βi≥0.5
(1 − βi)
∏
βj<0.5
βj
we only need to show, now, that both these probabilities can be obtained (under different
schedulers) for the same observable.
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Fig. 4. The dependency of α-anonymity on β’s in the case of 3-6 cryptographers.
Consider the coin configuration in (1). Let ς be the scheduler that selects Crypt 0 as
the payer. Then the system will output the observable o = b0b1 . . . bn−1 where (using
⊕ to represent the binary sum)
b0 = Coin0 ⊕ 1
bi = Coin i−1 ⊕ Coin i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2
bn−1 = Coinn−2
Clearly pς(o) = p1.
Consider now the coin configuration in (2). Let ϑ be the scheduler that selects
Cryptn−1 as the payer. It is easy to see that the output o
′ = b′0b
′
1 . . . b
′
n−1 of the system
is the same as before, in fact for each i, Coin ′i = Coin i ⊕ 1. Hence we have:
b′0 = Coin
′
0 = Coin0 ⊕ 1 = b0
b′i = Coin
′
i−1 ⊕ Coin
′
i = Coin i−1 ⊕ 1 ⊕ Coin i ⊕ 1
= Coin i−1 ⊕ Coin i = bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2
b′n−1 = Coin
′
n−2 ⊕ 1 = Coinn−2 ⊕ 1 ⊕ 1 = Coinn−2 = bn−1
Hence we have o′ = o and pϑ(o) = p2. ut
It is possible to show that the above theorem holds also when the topology is a ring.
On the other hand, it does not hold for graphs which contain one or more nodes with an
odd number of adjacent edges.
Figure 4 illustrates the dependency of α on β for three to six cryptographers, where
for all i, βi = β (uniform coins). We note that the anonymity level increases (i.e. α
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Fig. 5. The DCP with three cryptographers and probabilistic master.
decreases) as the number of cryptographers increases. If the coins are fair (β = 0.5),
then we have strong anonymity, i.e. α = 0. In the two extreme cases of β = 0 or β = 1,
the α-anonymity is always 1, which is maximal. It is also possible to show that α is
expressed by a polynomial on β whose degree is n − 1 if n is even, and n − 2 if n is
odd.
4 Weak anonymity for probabilistic users
In this section we consider the case in which the user is selected according to a certain
probability distribution. Since we assume that we have no other source of nondetermin-
ism, the automata that we consider in this section are fully probabilistic. For example,
in the case of the DCP with three cryptographers, we have the automaton represented
in Figure 5.
4.1 Focusing on the probabilities of the observables
The fully probabilistic version of Definition 5, corresponding also to the weak version
of Definition 3, is the following:
Definition 6 (α-anonymity for probabilisitic users). Given α ∈ [0, 1], a fully proba-
bilistic system (M, I, a, B, p) is α-anonymous if
max{ p(o | a(i)) − p(o | a(j)) | i, j ∈ I, o ∈ O, p(a(i)) > 0, p(a(j)) > 0 } = α
Like Definition 5, this notion focuses on the probability of the observables.
It is possible to prove that for the DCP the α of the above definition depends on
the βi’s exactly like the α for nondeterministic users (Definition 5). In fact consider,
in the case of nondeterministic users, a scheduler ς that selects i, i.e. pς(a(i)) = 1.
Then assume, in the case of probabilistic users, that pς(a(i)) > 0. It is easy to see that
pς(o) = p(o | a(i)).
So, in a sense, the notion of anonymity proposed in Definition 6 does not seem to
introduce any new technical challenge with respect to the study done for the case of
nondeterministic users.
In next section we investigate, instead, the weak version of the alternative notion of
anonymity given in Definition 4.
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4.2 Focusing on the probabilities of the users
We take here the point of view that anonymity means to preserve the probability of the
users, like in [6] and [7].
Definition 7 (α-anonymity for probabilisitic users – alternative notion). Given α ∈
[0, 1], a fully probabilistic system (M, I, a, B, p) is α-anonymous if
max{ p(a(i) | o) − p(a(i) | a) | i ∈ I, o ∈ O, p(o ∩ a) > 0} = α
Intuitively, p(a(i) | o) − p(a(i) | a) = α means that, after observing o, the
probability we attribute to i as the performer of the action, has increased by an additive
factor α.
We study now the dependency of α on the βi’s in the case of the DCP with n
cryptographers on a linear graph. We need to introduce some definitions: Let pi be the
probability that Crypt i is the payer. Of course, the probability that one of the cryptog-
raphers is the payer is then
∑n−1
i=0 pi. Let k be the index of the cryptographer with the
highest probability, i.e.
pk = max{pi | i ∈ [0, n − 1]}
For i ∈ [0, n − 2], define
γi =



βi if βi ≥ 0.5
1 − βi otherwise
Finally, for an arbitrary j ∈ [0, n − 1], define
qj =











j−1
∏
i=0
γi
k−1
∏
i=j
(1 − γi)
n−2
∏
i=k
γi if j ≤ k
k−1
∏
i=0
γi
j−1
∏
i=k
(1 − γi)
n−2
∏
i=j
γi otherwise
We are now ready to show how α depends on the βi’s:
Theorem 2. In the DCP on a linear graph with n nodes the α in Definition 7 depends
on the βi’s (and on the pi’s) as follows:
α =
qk pk
n−1
∑
j=0
qj pj
−
pk
n−1
∑
j=0
pj
(3)
Proof By definition, the configuration of the coins with the highest probability is the
one in which Coin i = 0 if βi ≥ 0.5 and Coin i = 1 otherwise. The probability of this
configuration is
∏
βi≥0.5
βi
∏
β`<0.5
(1 − β`) =
n−2
∏
i=0
γi = qk
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Consider now the event a(k) expressing that Cryptk is the payer, and let o = b0b1 . . . bn−1
be the observable which corresponds to the above coin configuration in combination
with the event a(k). We will show that o and a(k) maximize the expression p(a(i) | o′)−
p(a(i) | a) and that it is equal to the Formula (3). First we need to compute the condi-
tional probability p(a(k) | o) = p(o ∩ a(k))/p(o). By definition, p(o ∩ a(k)) = qk pk.
As for p(o), observe that p(o ∩ a(j)) = qj pj for any j ∈ [0, n − 1], in fact to obtain
the same o when Crypt j is the payer, it is sufficient to flip all the coins between j and
k, which gives a coin configuration with probability qj . Hence, we have
p(o) =
n−1
∑
j=0
p(o ∩ a(j)) =
n−1
∑
j=0
qj pj
Finally it is easy to see that p(a(k) | o) maximizes p(a(i) | o′), that it is linear on p(a(k),
and that p(a(j) | a) = p(a(j))/p(a). Hence, p(a(k) | o) − p(a(k) | a) maximizes
p(a(i) | o′) − p(a(i) | a) and coincides with the Formula (3). ut
Figure 6 shows the dependency of α on the βi’s in the case of three cryptographers.
The various graphs refer to different probability distributions for the payer. It is worth
noting that, in contrast to the notion of α-anonymity given in Definition 6, the version
presented in this section depends not only the βi’s, but also on the p(a(i))’s. On the
other hand, in the limit case of strong anonymity, the two notions are equivalent, as
explained in Section 2.3.
5 Automatic Analysis
In the case of a very simple topology (linear graphs) we have been able to express
the dependency of α on the βi’s with a mathematical formula. In this way, if we have a
system whose internal bias are known, it is immediate to check whether it satisfies weak
anonymity (for a given α) or not. It is possible to extend the method also to rings, but
as the graphs get more complicated, it is not clear how to proceed to find the formula
that express the dependency. This is a typical situation for most real-life systems: the
symbolic analysis is often unfeasible, and we have to resort to automatic tools supported
by computers.
In this section, we describe how to use the probabilistic model checker PRISM to
check the property of the α-anonymity for the DCP. We consider both nondetermin-
istic and probabilistic masters (recall that in the DCP nondeterministic/probabilistic
master is synonymous of nondeterministic/probabilistic users). We model the DCP as
a discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC) in the case of a probabilistic master, and as
Markov decision process (MDP) in the case of a nondeterministic master4. The PRISM
input language is a simple, state-based language, based on the Reactive Modules for-
malism of Alur and Henzinger [1]. The events are formalized using the temporal prob-
abilistic logic PCTL [8]. Once this translation is done, we can use PRISM to compute
4 DTMC and MDP, which are the formats accepted by PRISM, can be seen as special cases of
probabilistic automata.
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Fig. 6. The dependency of α-anonymity on the βi’s in the case of three cryptographers.
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the probabilities of the relevant events so to check α-anonymity. A brief overview of
PRISM and PCTL is given in the appendix.
The following code is for three cryptographers and two coins arranged in a line. It
can be easily generalized to more cryptographers and a different graph structure. First
we describe the variables we use in the model. N is the number of cryptographers,
and, since the topology is a line, there are N-1 coins in the model. The probabilities
of each coin of showing head are defined as beta0, beta1, etc. We define three more
state variables: s master: [0..2] for the master, s coin: [0..N-1] to indicate how many
coins have been flipped, and s crypt: [0..N] to indicates how many cryptographers have
decided their outputs. payerid=N indicates that either no cryptographer will pay or the
master hasn’t decided yet.. Initially, they are all 0. Once the execution terminates, we
will have s master=2, s coin=N-1, and s crypt=N. The variable payerid: [0..N] init
N is used to record who is the payer. The variable toss: bool init false is used to let the
coins to be flipped after the master has made his decision.
In the following, we consider the case N = 3. We use the variables crypt0, crypt1,
crypt2 to record the values computed by each cryptographer, that are either 0 or 1
and depend on whether the cryptographer is paying and on the sides of the coins the
cryptographer can see. Initially, their values are 0. In the model, there are two coins
coin0 and coin1. The first is shared shared by Cryptographers 0 and 1, the second is
shared by Cryptographers 1 and 2. We use 0 for head, and 1 for tail.
Next, we describe the behavior of the master, the coins and the cryptographers. If
the master is nondeterministic, he will decide nondeterministically the payer: one of the
cryptographers (payerid = 0, 1, or 2) or himself (payerid = 3). Once he has made the
decision, the value of toss is set to true, in order to let the coins to be flipped.
[] (s master=0) → (s master’=1) & (payerid’=0);
[] (s master=0) → (s master’=1) & (payerid’=1);
[] (s master=0) → (s master’=1) & (payerid’=2);
[] (s master=0) → (s master’=1) & (payerid’=3);
[] (s master=1) & (!toss) → (s master’=2) & (toss’=true);
If the master is probabilistic, then the choice of the payer is based on a probability
distribution. For instance:
[] (s master=0) →
0.5: (s master’=1) & (payerid’=0) +
0.3: (s master’=1) & (payerid’=1) +
0.1: (s master’=1) & (payerid’=2) +
0.1: (s master’=1) & (payerid’=3);
[] (s master=1) & (!toss) → (s master’=2) & (toss’=true);
Once toss becomes true, the coins start to flip. With probabilities beta0 and beta1,
the side of the coins will be head. With probabilities 1-beta0 and 1-beta1, the side of
the coins will be tail. Each time when a coin is flipped, the value of s coin is increased
by one.
[] (s coin=0) & (toss) →
beta0: (coin0’=0) & (s coin’=s coin+1) +
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(1-beta0): (coin0’=1) & (s coin’=s coin+1);
[] (s coin=1) & (toss) →
beta1: (coin1’=0) & (s coin’=s coin+1) +
(1-beta1): (coin1’=1) & (s coin’=s coin+1);
After all the coins have been flipped (s coin=N-1), the cryptographers calculate the
value of their variable crypt0, crypt1 and crypt2. Once a cryptographer has terminated
this calculation, the value of s crypt is increased by 1. Since the Cryptographers 0 and
2 sit at the two ends of the line, they can only observe one coin: Cryptographer 0 sees
Coin 0, and Cryptographer 2 sees Coin 1. If Cryptographer 0 is the payer, he will set the
variable crypt0 to 1 if he sees the head of Coin 0, and to 0 otherwise. If Cryptographer 0
is not the payer, he will set crypt0 to 0 if he sees the head of Coin 0, and to 1 otherwise.
The code for Cryptographer 2 is similar: just rename crypt0 into crypt2, coin0 into
coin1, and s crypt=0 into s crypt=2.
[] (s crypt=0) & (s coin=N-1) & (payerid=0) & (coin0=0) s→
(crypt0’=1) & (s crypt’=s crypt+1);
[] (s crypt=0) & (s coin=N-1) & !(payerid=0) & (coin0=0) →
(crypt0’=0) & (s crypt’=s crypt+1);
[] (s crypt=0) & (s coin=N-1) & (payerid=0) & (coin0=1) →
(crypt0’=0) & (s crypt’=s crypt+1);
[] (s crypt=0) & (s coin=N-1) & !(payerid=0) & (coin0=1) →
(crypt0’=1) & (s crypt’=s crypt+1);
The behavior of Cryptographer 1 is slightly different, since he can observe two
coins. If he is the payer, he will set the variable crypt1 to 1 if the two coins have the
same side, and to 0 otherwise. If he is not the payer, he will set crypt1 to 0 if the two
coins have the same side, and to 1 otherwise.
[] (s crypt=1) & (s coin=N-1) & (payerid=1) & (coin1=coin0) →
(crypt1’=1) & (s crypt’=s crypt+1);
[] (s crypt=1) & (s coin=N-1) & !(payerid=1) & (coin1=coin0) →
(crypt1’=0) & (s crypt’=s crypt+1);
[] (s crypt=1) & (s coin=N-1) & (payerid=1) & !(coin1=coin0) →
(crypt1’=0) & (s crypt’=s crypt+1);
[] (s crypt=1) & (s coin=N-1) & !(payerid=1) & !(coin1=coin0) →
(crypt1’=1) & (s crypt’=s crypt+1);
A self-loop is added in the end of the specification to avoid deadlock states5.
[] (s coin=N-1) & (s master=2) & (s crypt=N) →
(s coin’=N-1) & (s master’=2) & (s crypt’=N);
In the DCP, an external observer can see the values of the variables crypt0, crypt2
and crypt2. Furthermore, the values of the variables in the PRISM model define the
states of the system. For example, the following predicate represents the final states in
which all cryptographers output 1. We denote it by o1.
5 This is required by the design of PRISM.
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(crypt0=1) & (crypt1=1) & (crypt2=1) &
(s crypt=3) & (s coin=2) & (s master=2)
For each type of master (nondeterministic or probabilistic) we can describe observ-
ables as a PCTL formula by using the P operator (see Appendix A.2). Then, we can use
PRISM to compute the probability of each observable for the analysis of α-anonymity.
Nondeterministic master: If the master is nondeterministic, we can compute the max-
imum and the minimum probability of each observable, under any possible scheduler
that selects one of the cryptographers to pay. Below, we specify the PCTL formulas to
compute the probabilities of observable o1.
Pmax=?[true U o1] and Pmin=?[true U o1]
Thus, it is sufficient to use the formulation of α-anonymity given by the following
proposition, whose proof is immediate:
Proposition 1. A system (M, I, a, B, Z, p) is α-anonymous (with respect to nondeter-
ministic users) if
max{ max{ pς(o) | ς ∈ Z, pς(o ∩ a) = pς(o) }
−
min{ pϑ(o) | ϑ ∈ Z, pϑ(o ∩ a) = pϑ(o) } | o ∈ O } = α
The results in Figure 4 have been checked using PRISM.
Probabilistic master: When the master is nondeterministic, α-anonymity is defined as
max{ p(a(i) | o) − p(a(i) | a) |i ∈ I, o ∈ O, p(o ∩ a) > 0 } = α.
Since PRISM does not support the calculation of conditional probability as a primitive,
we have to compute each p(a(i) | o) using the equivalent expression p(a(i) ∩ o)/p(o).
As for p(a(i) | a), this is the same as p(a(i))/p(a). For example, in case of three
cryptographers, p(a(0) ∩ o1) can be computed by using the PCTL formula
P=?[true U o1 ∧ (payerid = 0 )]
The results presented in Figure 6 have been checked using PRISM.
6 Conclusion
We propose two notions of weak probabilistic anonymity, for the cases of nondetermin-
istic and probabilistic users, respectively. We have applied these two notions to the DCP
with biased coins, and we have described the functional dependency of the weakness
level on the biased factor of the coins. Furthermore we have coded in PRISM the DCP
and the formulas that express weak anonymity.
This paper builds on the framework of probabilistic anonymity proposed in [4] that
we have summarized in Section 2.3. The notions that we investigate here represent a
generalization of the strong probabilistic anonymity proposed in [4].
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To our knowledge, the first notion of probabilistic anonymity was proposed (al-
though not with an explicit definition) in [6]. That notion corresponds to one of the
notions of strong anonymity for probabilistic users investigated in [4], and more pre-
cisely, to the one recalled in Definition 4. This is the notion for which we have given
the weak version in Definition 7.
Reiter and Robin have proposed in [10] an hierarchy of notions of probabilistic
anonymity, at different levels of strength:
Beyond suspicion The actual user (i.e. the user that performed the action) is not more
likely (to have performed the action) than every other user.
Probable innocence The actual user has probability less than 1/2.
Possible innocence There is a non trivial probability that another used could have per-
formed the action.
These notions were only given informally in [10]. If one has to interpret them literally,
they do not have much in common with the notions investigated here (and in [4]). How-
ever, we suspect that the authors intended to express notions similar to ours. In fact, the
property of anonymity they prove for the system Crowds (probable innocence) does not
mention at all the probability of the user, but only the probability of the observables. A
sort of probable innocence in that sense could be expressed formally by our Definition 5
by taking α = 1/2.
Halpern and O’Neill have proposed in [7] various notions of probabilistic anonymity,
focusing on the probability of the users. Their principal notion is based on epistemic
logic and is formulated as a requirement on the knowledge of the observer about the
probability of the user. They have given both strong and weak version of this notion,
capturing formally the three levels of the hierarchy proposed by [10] (see above). Again,
these notions do not seem directly related to the ones we investigate in this paper. On the
other hand, Halpern and O’Neill have proposed also another notion, called conditional
anonymity (cfr. Definition 4.4 in [7]), which corresponds to the strong probabilistic
anonymity recalled in Definition 4.
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A Appendix
A.1 A brief overview of PRISM
PRISM [9] is a probabilistic model checker. It allows one to model and analyze systems
and algorithms containing probabilistic aspects. PRISM supports three kinds of prob-
abilistic models: discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs), Markov decision processes
(MDPs) and continuous-time Markov chains (CTMCs). We present the first two mod-
els briefly. A more detailed description of each model and PRISM can be found at
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/ dxp/prism/.
A DTMC can be defined as consisting of a finite set of states S, an initial state s0, a
transition probability matrix P : S × S → [0, 1] such that ∀s ∈ S,
∑
s′∈S P (s, s) = 1,
and a labeling function from states to a finite set of atomic predicates L : S → 2AP .
MDPs extend DTMCs by allowing both probabilistic and nondeterministic behavior.
An MDP is defined as consisting of a set of states S, an initial state s0, a function
Steps which maps each state in S to a finite non-empty set of probability distributions
over S, and a labeling function L. The transition from a state s ∈ S is determined
by selecting an element µ of Steps(s) nondeterministically and then choosing a state
probabilistically, according to the distribution µ.
A system in PRISM is composed of a number of modules that contain local vari-
ables, and that can interact with each other. The behavior of a DTMC is described by a
set of commands of the form:
[a] g → λ1 : u1 + . . . + λ` : u`;
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a is an action label in the style of process algebras, which introduces synchroniza-
tion into the model. It can only be performed simultaneously by all modules that have
an occurrence of action label a in their specification. If a transition does not have to
synchronize with other transitions, then no action label needs to be provided for this
transition. The symbol g is a predicate over all the variables in the system. Each ui
describes a transition which the module can make if g is true. A transition updates the
value of the variables by giving their new primed value with respect to their unprimed
value. The λi are used to assign probabilistic information to the transition. It is required
that λ1 + · · · + λ` = 1. This probabilistic information can be omitted if ` = 1 (and so
λ1 = 1). PRISM considers states without outgoing transitions as error states; terminat-
ing states can be modeled by adding a self-loop. PRISM models which are MDPs can
also exhibit local non-determinism, which allows the modules to make nondeterminis-
tic choices themselves. For example, the probabilistic choice in the previous command
can be made nondeterministic as follows:
[a] g → u1;
...
[a] g → u`;
A.2 A brief overview of PCTL
PRISM performs model checking against specifications written in the probabilistic tem-
poral logic PCTL [8, 5, 3] if the model is a DTMC or an MDP, or CSL [2] in the case
of a CTMC. PCTL can express properties of the form “under any scheduling of pro-
cesses, the probability that event E occurs is at least p”. The syntax of PCTL is given
as follows:
Φ ::= true | false | a | Φ ∧ Φ | Φ ∨ Φ | ¬Φ | Ponp[Ψ ]
Ψ ::= XΦ | Φ U≤k Φ | Φ U Φ
where a are predicates over state variables, on∈ {<,≤,≥, >} is a Boolean operator,
p ∈ [0, 1] is a probability and k is an integer. Φ denotes a state formula and Ψ a path
formula, these are evaluated over states and paths of a DTMC or MDP, respectively,
where a path is a sequence of states connected by transitions. A state always satisfies
true, it never satisfies false . The Boolean operators have the usual meanings. XΦ is
true if and only if Φ is satisfied in the next state of the path. Φ1 U≤k Φ2 is true if and
only if Φ2 is satisfied in one of the first k states in the path and Φ1 is satisfied in all
preceding states. Φ1 U Φ2 is true if and only if Φ1 U≤k Φ2 for some k ≥ 0. The formula
Pon[Ψ ] is true in a state s if the probability that a path starting in s satisfying the path
formula Ψ meets the bound on p. The definition of a probability measure over paths of a
DTMC is standard [8]. For MDPs, a probability measure can only be defined once the
nondeterministic choices have been removed. Hence, a more accurate interpretation of
the formula Ponp[Ψ ] is that the probability of Ψ being satisfied meets the bound on p for
all resolutions of non-determinism [3].
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For the purpose of the analysis of α-anonymity, we are interested in formulas of
the form Ponp[true U Φ], evaluated in the initial state s0. Here, Φ specified a system
configuration of interest, typically representing a particular observation by the external
observers.
In general, PCTL formulas must always evaluate to a Boolean value, the proba-
bilistic operators P should always include a bound on p. However, it is often useful
to know the actual probability that some behavior is observed, rather than just check
that the probability is above or below a given bound. PRISM allows properties of the
form P=?[Ψ ]. These formulas return a numerical rather than a Boolean value. Again
note that, for MDPs, since probabilities can only be computed once the nondetermin-
istic choices have been resolved. Hence, there is actually a minimum and a maximum
probability of a path formula being satisfied, quantifying over all possible resolutions.
Therefore, for MDPs PRISM allows two possible types of formula: Pmax=?[Ψ ] and
Pmin=?[Ψ ], which return the maximum and minimum probabilities, respectively.
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